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Henry Home was born in Kames, near Duns, in the Scottish borders in 1696. He 
came to Edinburgh in 1712 as an apprentice to a member of the writers of the signet, 
and following a public examination in front of the Lords of Session on 19 January 
1723, was admitted to the Faculty of Advocates. In 1728, he published 
his Remarkable Decisions of the Court of Session from 1716 to 1728, a notable feat 
of stamina and industry. He became Lord Kames on 6 February 1752, when he took 
his seat as a Lord Ordinary in the Court of Session. He died on 27 December 1782, 
aged 86. A biography of Kames was written by Ian Simpson Ross in 1972, which 
remains to this day a wonderful portrait of Kames and the world which he inhabited. 
A friend of James Boswell, David Hume, Adam Smith, William Hamilton, Benjamin 
Franklin and John Millar, he was well connected. He was also a prolific writer, 
publishing fourteen books on topics ranging from agriculture to aesthetics. He has 
not received until now an overarching intellectual biography, although William C. 
Lehmann’s 1971 biography, Henry Home, Lord Kames and the Scottish 
Enlightenment: A Study in the National Character and in the History of Ideas came 
close to this in its ambition. In spite of his influence and ideas being well-known 
within the existing literature he has not received, at least according to Rahmatian, 
sufficient attention as a thinker. However, Rahmatian’s monograph is a significant 
contribution on both accounts, offering both a new appraisal of Kames’ ideas as a 
whole and an overarching examination of his oeuvre. 
Lord Kames does not generally require much of an introduction; his reputation often 
precedes him. However, there can be a tendency to parody Kames like a character 
from Blackadder. Rahmatian summarizes what he sees as the (misleading) later 
reputation of Kames: an unoriginal thinker, who was ‘domineering and arrogant, and 
published heaps of books of questionable quality which are only worth quoting to 
demonstrate oddities of thought and to make the real geniuses of the Scottish 
Enlightenment, such as Hume or Smith, shine in a brighter light’; he ‘dabbled in 
many unrelated areas, mastered none properly (including law), and was essentially a 
conservative, derivative writer within the mainstream of eighteenth-century Scotland’ 
(vi). Although it is difficult to find anyone who would stand by such an outspoken 
assessment of Kames, he is certainly correct to suggest that Kames can be 
dismissed too easily as an artefact of and not an insight to the intellectual life of 
eighteenth-century Scotland. However, what is distinctive about Rahmatian’s 
engagement with Kames, and the argument of this book, is that Kames remains to 
this day a rich source of ideas and understanding. 
The first half of the book offers a general overview of Kames’ worldview. Chapters 2–
5 deal with Kames’ theory of aesthetics, epistemology, causation, reasoning, moral 
and political philosophy. They also offer the reader an introduction to Kames’ theory 
of ‘improvement’ and anthropology. In general, these chapters try to paint a picture 
of interconnectedness and a sense of an overall project. Rahmatian therefore offers 
something valuable here; it is an attempt to observe Kames’ body of work and to 
determine some general themes or ideas which are Kamesian. He argues that 
Kames is more practical and realistic in his approach to the moral sense of man 
when compared to Shaftesbury and Hutcheson and suggests that this originates in 
Kames’ training as a lawyer. He also suggests, as has been argued before, that his 
theory of justice can be seen as a response to Hume’s conventional theory, which 
stressed public utility as the source of our sense of justice. What Rahmatian goes on 
to argue in Chapter 3 is that Kames' main achievement was ‘a concept of morality 
[which is] a workable solution for the law, unburdened by complicated philosophical 
ramifications’. A key argument which Rahmatian maintains through these chapters is 
that Kames’ Elements of Criticism is ‘a central treatise in Kames’s oeuvre’ (20), 
which gives an account of man’s moral sense. 
Chapter 4 argues that Kames is a ‘principal representative’ of a characteristic of the 
Scottish Enlightenment: development and improvement. Rahmatian argues that 
Kames’ Sketches of the History of Man is ‘built on the notion of progress’ (92). Two 
ideas underlie Kames’ approach, one is that social institutions go through – or have 
been through – a process of evolution; the second, that one can see this process of 
change through history, which can be studied through a mixture of historical-
empirical inquiry and a philosophical understanding of the arrangement of historical 
processes. He argues that in Kames you encounter ‘the distinctive mixture between 
ahistorical “pure” philosophical thought and an anthropological/social history of man 
that is founded on philosophical assumptions’ (93). What Rahmatian points out here, 
is that Kames’ turn to history is typical of the Enlightenment, where ‘one can present 
divergent positions and back these up with undeniable evidence from history. This 
has a corrosive effect on orthodoxies and dogmatic systems, such as religion or 
morality because it invariably allows a relativistic point of view’. This is a theme that 
he picks up again in the second half of the book which looks at Kames’ approach to 
legal history, property, equity, obligations, and criminal law. 
Chapter 6 is an overview of Kames’ view of legal history. However somewhat out of 
the blue, Rahmatian criticizes in this chapter black-letter lawyers, when he says ‘[f]or 
the ahistorical mind of the modern black-letter lawyer [Kames’ approach to 
law] … may be astonishing, but for Kames the present law is inevitably the result of a 
historical process and of an anthropological development; it is also the outcome, if 
not a branch, of applied moral philosophical reasoning’ (190). Whether he has picked 
the correct interlocutor or not, what Rahmatian shows here is that Kames wanted to 
elevate law to the status of science, which for him meant that law should be studied 
historically, anthropologically and be subject to moral assessment. Rahmatian 
argues in the spirit of Kames that ‘[i]f law is studied divorced from its historical and 
philosophical context, it degenerates into a dry set of meaningless and unsystematic 
rules, adhered to on the basis of authority only, and not developed by the exercise of 
reason’ (190). Some readers may have sympathy with this position; and Rahmatian 
argues that in Kames you can find an example of how legal history can be used to 
challenge the authority or nature of the law we inherit. 
In many ways, Chapter 7 feels like the centrepiece of Rahmatian’s book. It deals with 
Kames’ theory of property, and attempts to show how Kames can speak to 
contemporary property theory. Indeed, Rahmatian says that his engagement with 
Kames on this topic inspired his own theory of dematerialized property, which aims 
to incorporate intellectual property into general property theory. However, when it 
comes to Kames he argues that he did not hold a purely conventional theory of 
property. He had a mixed theory somewhere between a Lockean labour theory and a 
natural rights theory. According to Kames, man has a sense of property and by 
occupation takes ownership, but he also takes ownership through mixing his labour 
with it (251). Property is founded upon the nature of man and his moral sense, that is 
‘[o]bserving the inner sense of property is also a human action that is morally 
beautiful, and a primary virtue’ (243). This chapter also plots out Kames’ dislike for 
feudalism and his attack on it throughout his printed work. Rahmatian argues that 
Kames’ theory is unique, possibly because he was aware of both the Civilian and 
English legal systems and because of the context of Enlightenment Scotland. In this 
chapter, the author demonstrates the real gains which can be made by 
contemporary legal thought when it engages seriously with the past. 
Chapter 11 examines the influence of Kames upon some of the founders of the 
United States of America, Franklin, Adams, Jefferson and Wilson. Rahmatian argues 
that Kames was ‘highly relevant’ to colonial America before and around the time of 
independence. First, because he offered a ‘fairly orderly and portable’ collection of 
‘large areas of knowledge’, which was of ‘much use in the intellectual outpost of 
civilisation’ (317); secondly, he was Scottish and not English, and seen to be 
sympathetic to the growing discontent of American settlers. Furthermore, the fact 
that he was a member of the ‘establishment’ gave his work some increased 
authority. He argues that Kames was ‘attractive to several of the founders’ although 
not collectively and through no specific work, he nevertheless influenced several of 
them individually. Kames reached them before they ‘entered the political arena’. 
Rahmatian concludes his assessment with the argument that ‘Kames’ relevance to 
these four individuals among the founders of the US was remarkable’ and that ‘one 
can argue that Kames’ influence on them was to some extent fairly representative for 
American as a whole at the time’ (317). 
The approach of Rahmatian will not be agreeable to everyone. Very little space is 
given to the specific context of eighteenth-century Edinburgh or the particular 
circumstances within which Kames wrote each of his specific texts. He does not 
make any distinction between the intention of the author and the meaning of the text. 
He speaks of Kames’ oeuvre without flinching, influences without exhaustive textual 
analysis, some of Kames’ ideas as if they are approximations of an ideal type, 
criticizes Kames and other writers for not getting it quite right, and assumes a level of 
consistency within Kames throughout the period of his career. Some will not blink an 
eye at any of this, others will. In other words, to read this book one needs to put to 
one side Quentin Skinner’s 1966 ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of 
Ideas’ and Michael Foucault’s The Archaeology of Knowledge of 1969. Some will 
find this hard to do. Others will find the absence of contemporary anxieties 
refreshing. Rahmatian writes very much within the classic genre of a history of ideas. 
A virtue for some, a vice for others. Or he possibly adopts what Richard Rorty has 
described as ‘rational reconstruction’ of past ideas in order to stimulate our ideas 
today. That being so, whether one takes a Skinner-approach or a classical-
approach, what we learn from Rahmatian’s exploration of Kames is that a great deal 
of our legal thinking today is based on assumptions and disciplinary boundaries. 
However, in Kames’ writing we see that he questioned almost everything, and tried 
to satisfy his own mind on almost everything from causation to aesthetics to history. 
Whether this is a good thing or necessary is another question. 
Rahmatian is to Kames, what Boswell was to Johnson. Or to put it as Thomas 
Carlyle did in 1832, ‘Boswell wrote a good Book because he had a heart and an eye 
to discern Wisdom, and an utterance to render it forth; because of his free insight, 
[and] … his lively talent’ (83, 1885). Rahmatian certainly is a lively writer. He holds no 
punches when speaking about contemporary doctrinal scholarship or the more 
methodological cautious. This sort of writing brings to mind some of the intellectual 
rough-and-tumble of the eighteenth century which Kames himself partook in. Indeed, 
given that Rahmatian’s final sentence encourages the reader, in the spirit of the 
Enlightenment, to disagree with him, at least in the details; he may enjoy an 
interlocutor who takes him to task on these points or on other matters he raises in 
this book. This review has not done so, although one would probably have to start 
with establishing agreement on methodology which may not be easily done. 
Whatever the case, Rahmatian has done a great service to legal history and 
Enlightenment studies by undertaking the incredibly challenging task of an 
intellectual biography of a polymath like Kames. One would hope this is not the last 
word on Kames’ ideas and the end of Rahmatian’s consideration of Kames. In fact, 
as the recent work of Jill Robbie shows in regard to Kames’ doctrine of common 
interest in Private Water Rights (2016), and the forthcoming monograph by Daniel 
Carr, Ideas of Equity (2017) suggests, there is a re-engagement at present with Lord 
Kames. If this is to continue, Rahmatian’s interpretation will be a key touchstone in 
the re-appraisal of Kames' ideas and methods. 
Stephen Bogle 
